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Abstract
Face recognition systems are used for user authentication in
everyday applications such as logging into a laptop or smart-
phone without need to memorize a password. However, they
are still vulnerable to spoofing attacks, as for example when an
imposter gains access to a system by holding a printed photo
of the rightful user in front of the camera. In this paper we are
concerned with the design of face image databases for evalu-
ating the performance of anti-spoofing algorithms against such
attacks. We present a new database, supporting testing against
an enhancement of the attack, where the imposter processes
the stolen image before printing it. By testing a standard anti-
spoofing algorithm on the new database we show a significant
decrease in its performance and, as a simple remedy to this
problem, we propose the inclusion of processed imposter im-
ages into the training set.
1 Introduction
Face recognition systems offer a fast, reliable, convenient and
inexpensive way for person authentication. However, the rela-
tively easy access to face image data of the average person, for
example by downloading photos or videos they have posted on
social media sites, means that face recognition is particularly
vulnerable to spoofing attacks. As a result, its use is restricted
to either applications where security is considered secondary to
convenience, e.g. log in to a personal laptop or a smartphone,
or to applications in tightly controlled environments, such as
passport control in airports. When either of these two condi-
tions is not met, e.g. money withdrawals from a street ATM
machine, face recognition is not deemed a suitable person au-
thentication method.
In one of the simplest spoofing attacks on a face recogni-
tion system, an imposter might print on paper the photo of the
rightful user and hold it in front of the camera of the face recog-
nition system to gain access. Despite the lack of sophistication
of such an attack, it is nevertheless capable to gain access to a
laptop or a smartphone protected by some of the most popular
face recognition user authentication systems [1]. As a response
to such vulnerabilities, the development of anti-spoofing algo-
rithms and techniques, commonly called liveness tests, has be-
come a very active research area.
The performance of anti-spoofing algorithms is evaluated
on databases containing both photos of real people called client
images, and photos of imposters, which essentially are photos
of client images and are called imposter images. The design of
such a database is a particularly challenging task given the mul-
tiple sources of variation in spoofing attacks. Indeed, a whole
range of choices, from the choice between a paper photo and an
electronic display for the attack, to the type of paper and printer
used to print a photo, to the size of that photo and the way it
is held in front of the camera, all these factors can impact the
effectiveness of the attack and thus the perceived performance
of the anti-spoofing algorithm.
In this paper we address a gap in the current practice of
the anti-spoofing algorithm evaluation, namely the assumption
that the attacker prints the photo of the rightful user as it is, i.e.
without attempting to process it in order to increase the effec-
tiveness of the attack. We created a face image database which
besides the usual imposter images it also contains imposter im-
ages obtained by photo-shooting printouts of sharpened client
images, see Figure 1. We thested the database on a standard
liveness test [2] and found that the more sophisticated attack
with processed imposter images is more likely to evade detec-
tion.
Contribution: the main contribution of the paper is the design
and construction of a database of face images for testing anti-
spoofing algorithms, which, to the best of our knowledge, is
the first one based on the assumption that the imposters may
use image processing tools to enhance the effectiveness of their
attack.
Limitation: as the main limitation of the paper we note that
our current database only serves as a proof of concept, consid-
ering only one image processing operation on the client images
before they are printed. However, extending the database with
imposter images that have undergone other types of processing
is a relatively straightforward, even though laborious, process.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2
we review the relevant literature. In Section 3 we describe the
details of the database. In Section 4 we briefly describe the live-
ness test we use for testing. In Section 5 we test the database by
running on it a standard liveness test and discuss the relevance
of the results. We conclude in Section 6.
Figure 1. The standard database design consisting of client
(A) and imposter images (B), is augmented with processed im-
poster images (C).
2 Related work
Face recognition is a well established research area with the
state of the art techniques achieving recognition rates that rival
the human ability to recognize faces under similar conditions.
The input of a face recognition algorithm can be a grayscale
or a color still image, a short video sequence or a 3D scan of
someones face. The first examples of successful face recog-
nition algorithms from still images were based on Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) [3] and [4, 5], while further im-
provements proposed in [6] were able to cope with large scale
databases and handle better the problem of pose variability by
using modular eigenspaces.
Biometric attacks fall in two main categories: direct and in-
direct. Direct attacks are based on the use of stolen biometric
information, either in digital form such as digital audio, images
or video, or in physical form, for example a fingerprint on a
gelatinous membrane. Indirect attacks rely on the use of com-
putational algorithms to construct biometric information and
use it to access the security system. Galbally et al. tested face
recognition systems based on PCA [7] and GMM and PCA
[8] against hill-climbing indirect attacks. In all cases it was
found that the attack could spoof the systems, but the GMM
was found more robust.
Liveness tests aim at distinguishing between live faces in
front of the camera and imposters. In the last few years they
have developed rapidly [9, 10, 11], although it is clear that they
can not be considered a mature technology yet. Head or face
movement and eye-blinking detection methods have been suc-
cessfully used liveness tests. Li et al. [12] proposed a liveness
test based on the different distributions in the frequency domain
of light reflected from a flat 2D surface or a 3D surface. Pan
et al. [13] use eye-blinking detection for a liveness test based
on a probabilistic model of eye-blinking behaviour. In [14] op-
tical flow lines are used to model and distinguish between live
face movement and still image movement. Lai and Tai [15] re-
cently proposed a liveness test against attacks by fake images or
videos displayed on HD screens by analyzing the chrominance
characteristics and the saturation of the face recognition sys-
tem’s input images. Convolutional neural networks have also
been recently employed to assist anti-spoofing techniques as in
[16] where the classifier is trained to distinguish between live
faces and imposter images from their differences in the edge
patterns and the surface textures in single frames of video se-
quences.
The liveness test we used to evaluate the Durham Face
Database was proposed by Tan et al. in [2]. There, they pro-
posed several variants of the basic algorithm and the one we
chose here trains a sparse logistic regression classifier with the
difference of Gaussians of the database images. In a further
improvement to the Tan et al. algorithms, [17] apply contrast-
limited adaptive histogram equalization before computing dif-
ferences of Gaussians, increasing the robustness of the test un-
der bad illumination conditions. Differences of Gaussians are
also used in [18], where a Support Vector Machine is trained.
The idea that a still image attack can be enhanced by digi-
tally processing the face image before printing it had been sug-
gested by the authors in [19]. However, as there are no publicly
available face image databases containing processed imposter
images as in Figure 1(C), we could not test our assumption.
Instead, we used the publicly available NUAA database, mea-
sured the performance of the liveness test in [2] against digi-
tally sharpened versions of imposter images, see Figure 1(B),
and argued that the drop in the performance of the liveness test
as evidence supporting our assumption.
2.1 Databases
The design of a database for evaluating liveness tests is a chal-
lenging task, given the variability of form of the imposter
attacks. An additional difficulty is that the performance of
the current state-of-the-art liveness tests seems to drop signifi-
cantly when the imposter attack deviates even slightly from the
protocol that was used to produce the imposter samples of the
training set. That is, for example, when a different paper type
is used, or a different printer or electronic display, or camera.
A similar problem has been observed in the behaviour of state-
of-the-art algorithms for the classic face recognition problem,
where it is usually referred to as the interoperability problem,
see for example Gallbaly and Satta [20]. As a result, it is im-
portant to have an exact description of the protocol under which
a face image database was constructed, even if that contains a
number of tedious and seemingly irrelevant details.
Next, we review the NUAA database, which as the Durham
Face Database consists of still images, and three databases
containing short video sequences, which nevertheless can also
be used to evaluate still image liveness tests after extracting
frames from the video sequences. We note that none of these
four databases contains images or videos produced by pro-
cessed imposter images, see Figure 1(C).
NUAA is a publicly avaliable database [2] containing face im-
ages of 15 participating people, taken under non-uniform light-
ing conditions. Participants were from both genders and were
asked to assume neutral facial expressions without head move-
ment or eye-blinking. The client image part of the database,
Figure 1(A), consists of 500 coloured images of each partici-
pant, with 640× 480 resolution, taken by a conventional web-
camera with a frame rate of 20fps. Client images were printed
in three different sizes, 6.8cm×10.2cm and 8.9cm×12.7cm on
photographic paper and 70g A4 paper, using an HP colour
printer. Imposters images, Figure 1(B), were produced from
these printouts with a Canon camera from a distance that would
allow the face to cover approximately 2/3 of the whole scene.
PRINT-ATTACK is a publicly available database [21] con-
taining videos from 50 participants. The videos were captured
under two different conditions: controlled and adverse. In the
controlled environment the background lighting conditions are
uniform, while the adverse environment has uncontrolled back-
ground lighting conditions. The database consists of a total of
200 real access videos and 200 videos of spoofing attempts,
which used A4 printed photos of the participants.
REPLAY-ATTACK was presented in [22] as an attempt to
enrich and overcome shortcomings of the PRINT-ATTACK
database. It contains short video recordings from 50 partici-
pants. Real-access videos were captured with an acquisition
system built on an Apple 13-inch MacBook laptop. They con-
sist of a couple of 15-second video clips for each participant
with 320×240 resolution at 25fps. For the spoofing attempts,
two high resolution shots of each person using a 12.1 mega-
pixel Canon PowerShot SX150 IS camera and an iPhone 3GS
3.1 mega pixel camera were taken. Spoofing attempts were
classified according to three different conditions: (i) photos
printed on A4 paper (ii) iPhone mobile display video and pho-
tos playbacks (iii) photos and videos been displayed on an iPad
screen with 1024×768 resolution. The REPLAY-ATTACK
database was then used to evaluate the performance of a live-
ness test based on histograms of Local Binary Patterns, as pro-
posed in [23], and a support vector machine as classifier.
CASIA is a database presented [18] and it was designed with
the maximisation of the variability as its main aim. The client
images come in three different imaging qualities: low, normal
and high. The spoofing attempts made use of either printed
photos on copper paper, or an iPad display. The database con-
sists of 12 videos for each subject, 3 of which are genuine and
9 are spoofs.
3 Database
The Durham Face Database contains face images from 21 peo-
ple. All photo-shooting sessions took place in the Imaging
Laboratory of Durham University and for each participant a
total of 50 photos were taken using a professional Canon EOS
Rebel T3i (600D) with a 18-250mm lens. The original photos,
together with the corresponding cropped images, the imposter
images and the processed imposter images produced by them
are all publicly available at Durham Face Database.
Client images: The camera was mounted on a tripod and oper-
ated with the default autofocus settings at 5, 184 × 3, 456 res-
olution. To isolate as much as possible the effect of the im-
age sharpening that w applied to create the processed imposter
images, all client images were taken in frontal view, with neu-
tral expressions, under uniform illumination and background
Figure 2. Imposter images captured with an iPhone 6s camera
from a distance of 6cm (i) and 9cm (ii). (iii)-(iv) DoG for the
images (i)-(ii) with the σ1 = 4 and σ2 = 8
conditions. The raw client images were cropped down to size
640× 640, which gives a good balance between image quality
and the speed of training and testing the classifier. For our pur-
poses, it was important to avoid any resizing of the images,
since that would mean an extra image processing operation
with a largely unpredictable and difficult to account for effect.
To achieve this, all participants were seated between 1m and
1.25m away from the camera, at which distance it was possible
to obtain tightly cropped face images of the required 640×640
resolution.
Imposter images: The imposter images were created from
client images as shown in Figure 1 (B). For each subject, an
arbitrarily chosen client image, which later would not be used
for either training or testing, was printed on A4 paper using
a Ricoh 4500 Photocopier. The printed paper was pinned on
a board and a series of photos were taken with the camera’s
autofocus mechanism re-enabled between any two shots.
Before opting for using the autofocus function of the cam-
era we compared between imposter images captured with man-
ual focus and autofocus and found that the latter were more
likely to be sharper and thus more challenging to classify cor-
rectly. We also note that our settings of the autofocus mech-
anism prevent the capture of blurry out-of-focus images by
blocking the shutter release. Figure 2 shows imposter images
produced from small size printed images re-captured by the
camera of an iPhone 6s with non-blocking autofocus mecha-
nism. When the autofocus mechanism fails the imposter image
becomes extremely blurry, see Figure 2, demonstrating the im-
portance of including the type of camera focus mechanism in
the design protocol of the database, for example blocking aut-
ofocus, non-blocking autofocus or fixed focus.
Processed imposter images: The processed imposter images
were created from the client images as shown in Figure 1 (B).
The same arbitrarily chosen client image used to create the im-
poster images was sharpened using Matlab’s imsharpen func-
tion with standard deviation σ = 8.0. Then, it was printed on
the Ricoh 4500 Photocopier and the same procedure that cre-
ated the imposter images was followed.
Figure 3 shows instances from the photo-shooting session.
The first column of Figure 4 shows client images images from
the Durham Face Database. The sharpened client images in
the second column, which are not part of the database, exhibit
higher contrast and some sharpening artifacts. The third col-
umn shows imposter images from the database; they are more
blurry than the client images. Finally, the fourth column shows
sharpened imposter images from the database, which show the
Figure 3. The photo-shooting sessions. Left: Creating client
images. Right: Creating imposter images.
highest visual similarity with the client images. Indeed, the di-
rect digital sharpening with Matlab’s imsharpen followed by a
procedural blurring by printing them on paper and re-capturing
them, seem to a great extent to cancel each other.
4 The liveness test
We tested the database by running on it a well-known liveness
test proposed in [2], which is conceptually simple and easy to
implement. While testing with various liveness tests would
have given us a better understanding of the behaviour of the
database, we note that the fundamental nature of the mathe-
matical and statistical tools employed by that test, namely dif-
ferences of Gaussians of images and sparse logistic regression,
make it a suitable choice as a representative liveness test.
Following [2], a difference of Gaussians of the images is
used to train a binary classifier with the client class been pho-
tos of real faces and the imposter class been recaptured images
of the photos of the faces. Assuming that the client and im-
poster classes are labeled {−1, 1}, respectively, the conditional
probability of an sample x being in the imposter class y = 1 is
Prob(y|x) = 11 + exp(−y(wTx+ b)) (1)
where w and b are the weight vector and the intercept returned
by the training algorithm. To avoid overfitting, sparse logistic
regression is used and thus, the values of w and b are computed
through the minimization of the cost function
min
w,b
loss(w, b) + λ‖w‖1 (2)
where the term λ‖w‖1 is added to favour sparse weight vectors,
i.e. vectors with most of their elements equal to zero, λ is a
user defined constant and loss is the standard loss function of
the logistic regression
loss(w, b) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
log(1 + exp(−yi(wTxi + b))) (3)
Figure 4. Samples from the Durham Face Database for three
different subjects. Left to right: a client image; a sharpened
client image; an imposter (re-captured) image of the client im-
age; an imposter of the sharpened client.
where m is the size of the training set of samples xi with asso-
ciated labels yi.
5 Testing
We tested the database by running on it the liveness test of Tan
et al. [2]. In all tests, the standard deviations of the differences
of Gaussians were set at σ1 = 4 and σ2 = 8. The results
are shown in Figure 5. Each diagram consists of two ROC
curves, one showing the performance of the classifier in distin-
guishing between client and imposter images and the other in
distinguishing between client and sharpened imposter images.
The four diagrams correspond to four different designs of the
training set which may contain:
(i) client and imposter images from all 21 subjects,
(ii) client and sharpened imposter images from all 21 sub-
jects,
(iii) client, imposter and sharpened imposter images from all
21 subjects,
(iv) client and imposter images from only 15 of the subjects,
while the test set contains images only from the other 6
subjects.
Since client images have always to be included in the train-
ing set, Figures 5(i)-(iii) cover all three cases regarding the
content of the training set: imposter images, sharpened im-
poster images, or both. Figure 5(i) verifies our main hypothe-
sis, showing that the performance of the liveness test decreases
considerably when the attacker uses sharpened imposter im-
ages. Indeed, the large gap between the two curves indicates a
significant drop of the performance of the liveness test, which
is largely due to the fact that the classifier was trained to dis-
tinguish between client and imposter images and not between
Figure 5. In each diagram the two ROC curves show the performance of the algorithm in distinguishing between client images and
imposter or sharpened imposter images, respectively. (i)-(iii) The training set consists of client images and: (i) imposter images,
(ii) sharpened imposter images, (iii) both imposter and sharpened imposter images, from all 21 subjects. (iv) The training set
consists of client and imposter images of 15 subjects, while images from the other 6 subjects are used for testing.
client and sharpened imposter images. This can be seen in Fig-
ure 5(ii), where the classifier is trained to distinguish between
client and sharpened imposter images and as a result the live-
ness test is much more efficient against attacks with such im-
ages. In Figure 5(iii), the classifier is trained to distinguish
between client images and imposters of both types and we no-
tice that its discriminative ability is only slightly worse against
sharpened imposter images. This is again an expected result
since the similarity between sharpened imposter and client im-
ages is higher than the similarity between client and imposter
images, as it is clear in Figure 4, and thus distinguishing be-
tween sharpened imposter and client images is a harder task
when no task is given preferential treatment during training.
From the results in Figures 5(i)-(iii) we conclude that by
sharpening the client image before printing and re-capturing it
to create imposter images, attackers can significantly increase
their chances of evading the Tan et al. liveness test. A very sim-
ple and largely effective countermeasure is to train the classifier
not only with imposter but with sharpened imposter images too.
In that case, there is only a slight decrease in the performance of
the classifier, which can be explained by the higher similarity
between client and sharpened imposter images, which makes
the distinction between these two classes an intrinsically more
difficult task.
Figure 5(iv) shows the results when the classifier is trained
with a cross-subject independent set of client and imposter
images. That is, the subjects are partitioned into two non-
overlapping subsets and images from the first subset are used
for training while images from the second subset are used for
testing. We notice that the cross-subject independence is a
strong assumption which is not used in the literature since live-
ness tests usually run in parallel to face recognition systems and
a positive classification of a subject by such a system implies
the presence of their images in the database. Nevertheless, Fig-
ure 5(iv) shows that even with cross-subject independence, our
claim that imposter attacks with sharpened images are stronger
than common imposter attacks is valid.
Figure 6. (i)-(ii) an imposter images from printouts by a Ri-
coh 4500 and a Bizhub c654e, respectively. (iii)-(iv) the corre-
sponding differences of Gaussians for σ1 = 4 and σ2 = 8.
5.1 Printer image processing
Apart from pointing out that the strength of malicious imposter
attacks can be underestimated if image processing operations
before image printing are not considered, the above results are
also relevant in the setting of the common imposter attacks
through the advanced image processing functionality of mod-
ern printers and cameras. As most printers and cameras make
use of proprietary image processing technology, the study of
the effect of printer and printer settings on the performance of
the liveness test is very challenging.
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of printer choice through an
example. Indeed, visual inspection of the printouts of the same
digital image by two different printers reveals significant dif-
ferences and as a result the differences of Gaussians of the
two images are also significantly different. From each of the
two printouts we created 10 imposter images and computed the
probabilities of the image to be imposters, see Eq. 1, using the
same classifier as in Figure 5(i). When the Ricoh 4500 print-
out was used, that is, from the printer that created the printouts
for the imposter images of the training set, the average proba-
bility was 0.929. On the other hand when the Bizhub c654e
printer was used the average probability dropped sharply to
0.083. Thus, the example indicates that the choice of printer
and printer settings can affect the performance of the liveness
test and perhaps, in agreement with what we found in our main
experiment, using a variety of printers and printer settings to
create the training set can increase the generality of the classi-
fier.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we presented Durham Face Database, a new pub-
licly available face image database for testing anti-spoofing al-
gorithms. The main novelty in its design is the inclusion of pro-
cessed imposter images, justified under the assumption that at-
tackers may process the client images before printing them for
imposter attacks, and in particular, they may sharpen them in
order to counteract the blurring induced by the printing and re-
capturing process. Our tests show a significant decrease in the
performance of a standard liveness when sharpened imposter
images are used, however, most of the performance loss can
be restored by the simple measure of including sharpened im-
poster images in the training set.
In the future we plan to extend the database with more types
of processed imposter images. In particular, instead of process-
ing the client images with existing, simple or sophisticated, im-
age processing operations, we would like to reverse engineer
the process and thus, be able to directly compute images which
under printing and re-capturing produce imposter images that
are as close as possible to the the original client images.
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